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Abstract
What constitutes illocutionary silencing? This is the key question underlying much
recent work on Catherine MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences women. In
what follows I argue that the focus of the literature on the notion of audience ‘uptake’
serves to mischaracterize the phenomena. I defend a broader interpretation of what it
means for an illocutionary act to succeed, and show how this broader interpretation
provides a better characterization of the kinds of silencing experienced by women.
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“[P]ornography and its protection have deprived women of speech,” writes Catherine
MacKinnon, and this is not intended to be metaphorical [MacKinnon, 1993, 9-10].
Pornography neither constitutes a physical impediment to the speech of women, nor
censors their words—the puzzle then is how to understand the claim. According to the
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standard account, due to Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby,1 MacKinnon is concerned
with illocutionary silencing. It is not that women are prevented from uttering words.
Rather, it is that those utterances are prevented from having the illocutionary force
they are intended to have. Women are prevented from doing the full range of things
that can be done with words. This then is a constraint on their freedom—there are
things they cannot do in virtue of being women—and since those things are things we
do with speech, it is in particular a constraint on their freedom of speech. The problem
is not that women are not able to speak, but that their illocutionary acts fail despite
their successful performance of the locutionary act.
The illocutionary silencing interpretation focuses on the Austinian notion of se-
curing uptake, or recognition, of the intended illocutionary act, and in particular on
the thesis that women are silenced when their illocutionary acts do not receive audi-
ence uptake. However critics of this strategy argue that uptake is not necessary for
successful illocutionary performance, concluding that even if pornography does cause
uptake failure women are not thereby silenced. In this paper I propose an alternative
analysis of silencing based on the suggestion in Austin that successful performance of
an illocutionary act requires not just recognition, but a normative change in the social
realm.2
After developing this view I explore some apparent counter-examples to the claim
that uptake is necessary for the performance of an illocutionary act. Close attention to
these examples, I argue, shows that in the cases where the illocutionary act is successful
it is because an appropriate change in the norms does occur, and that in the cases where
the illocutionary act fails such a change does not occur.
Finally I show that my account of illocutionary silencing matches better than the
1See [Langton, 1993, Hornsby, 1995, Hornsby and Langton, 1998, Hornsby and Langton, 2009,
Langton, 2009].
2The question of whether the right to free speech, especially the version thereof encoded in the US
constitution, should, or as a practical matter could, be extended to cover illocutionary acts is not one that I
will address. Nor will I concern myself with the question of whether pornography is in fact a, or the, central
cause of women’s silencing in the sexual sphere.
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uptake focused account with the sorts of examples that MacKinnon describes, and with
the well known phenomena of victim blaming in cases of rape.
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In Jennifer Hornsby’s words, uptake is when “one’s audience take[s] one’s words in some
way that one intends” [Hornsby, 1995, 133]. If I utter the words ‘Look, a train’ with
the intent of warning my companion against crossing the tracks, but she instead takes
them as urging her to cross faster so as to not miss the train, my intended illocutionary
act—warning—has not been recognized as such by my audience, that is, I have not
achieved uptake. The idea that audience recognition plays a role in performances
of illocutionary acts originates in J. L. Austin’s How to do things with words. Less
attention has been paid to another aspect of Austin’s account, which focuses on the
normative changes involved in an illocutionary act taking effect:
The illocutionary act ‘takes effect’ in certain ways, as distinguished from
producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the
‘normal’ way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. Thus ‘I name this
ship the Queen Elizabeth’ has the effect of naming or christening the ship;
then certain subsequent acts such as referring to it as the Generalissimo
Stalin will be out of order [Austin, 1975, 117].
The point is this: acknowledging that Sarah named the ship the Queen Elizabeth,
but persisting in calling it the Generalissimo Stalin, accepting that name from others,
and perhaps further failing to recognize what is referred to by someone who does call
the ship the Queen Elizabeth, suggests that despite the presence of uptake—despite
explicit recognition of her act as an act of naming—Sarah’s illocutionary act has not
taken effect. An attempt to name a ship the Queen Elizabeth that does not make
referring to it as the Generalissimo Stalin out of order (and as the Queen Elizabeth in
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order) is unhappy, but more precisely, naming is not achieved.
Austin’s example is a case of legal naming, but similar considerations apply in the
case of nicknames and private names. When my daughter was learning to speak she
only said part of her name, which sounded like ‘Weeze’. Her uncle continues to call
her this. What makes this a successful case of (nick)naming is that she recognizes this
as a name that applies to her, and so do the other members of the family, even though
none of the rest of us call her that. If we didn’t accept this reference as in order,
to use Austin’s phrase, the attempt at naming would have fallen flat even though we
recognized his initial dubbing as an attempt to introduce a nickname.
Naming need not be all or nothing. In Calgary there is a stadium that when
originally constructed was called the Olympic Saddledome. In the years since the
building has been sponsored by a series of different entities, resulting in a series of
names such as the Canadian Air Saddledome, the Pengrowth Saddledome, and cur-
rently the Scotiabank Saddledome. Official publications, tickets for events, etc. have
all respected these series of double-barrelled names. But in ordinary conversation it
would be remarkable—out of order even—for the venue to be called anything other
than the Saddledome.
Marina Sbisa`, discussing the ship naming passage in Austin, suggests that for any
illocutionary act there is a set of changes within the realm of social conventions con-
comitant on successful performance of the act [Sbisa`, 2009, 45]. This is in direct conflict
with the commonly held view on which simple audience recognition of the illocutionary
act as an act of its type constitutes illocutionary success. It is easy to see why audience
uptake might normally be taken to be a sine qua non of illocutionary acts—without
that recognition it is not obvious how this sort of normative change could come about.
But mere uptake does not guarantee that a change at the level of social conventions
actually occurs, and if there are cases where the change in norms does happen without
immediate audience uptake, then it seems that the absence of uptake is not in itself an
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obstacle to the act being performed.3
If illocutionary acts take effect just in case certain normative changes come about,
then one form of illocutionary silencing occurs when an illocution is performed correctly
but the concomitant effects do not take effect, that is, when it doesn’t become out of
order to do or say certain things. This is suggests a reading of MacKinnon on which
pornography prevents women’s illocutionary acts from taking effect.
3
In their critiques of Hornsby and Langton’s treatment of illocutionary silencing Daniel
Jacobson and Alexander Bird argue that while the failure to achieve uptake may make
a illocutionary act infelicitous, it does not in general block performance of the act.
In what follows, I will argue that in each of the cases under discussion the question
of whether the illocutionary act occurs depends on whether the requisite normative
change occurs, not on whether the immediate audience gives the illocution uptake.
Jacobson’s main argument against the necessity of uptake is based on the fact that
a speaker may fail to receive uptake from a hearer for idiosyncratic reasons—because
the hearer is incompetent, or even hostile [Jacobson, 1995, 73-76]. Imagine that Sally
mails Bill a wedding invitation, and Bill, due to mental illness, takes her to be showing
him the invitation to taunt him, rather than inviting him. Has she not nonetheless
invited him?4 What does seem to be clear in this case is that it would not be out of
order for Bill to attend the wedding, so that the invitation has indeed taken effect.
Bird develops Jacobson’s critique further by providing a number of examples where
he maintains uptake is not present but where his intuitions, and he hopes the readers,
3While I support the strong version of the view, on which all illocutionary acts when successful institute
a change at the level of social conventions, it is probably sufficient for the analysis which follows that at least
some illocutionary acts, particularly those of consent and refusal, do so.
4In Jacobson’s description of this case he tells us that Bill believes that Sally “does not really want him
to attend” [Jacobson, 1995, 73]. That is, he describes Bill not as not recognizing that he is being invited to
Sally’s wedding, but as believing that the invitation is insincere. As Jacobson presents it then we do not in
fact have a case of uptake failure at all. I have modified the case to rectify this deficiency.
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are that the illocutionary act has been pulled off nonetheless.
Bird’s first example of a successful illocutionary act without uptake is in a legal
setting. He writes,
When the judge passes sentence, his words may be addressed to the
prisoner in the dock, but sentence is passed whether or not the prisoner
realizes that this is what the judge is about. Nor does anyone else have to
realize that, so long as the judge performs his duty in accordance with the
law and established procedures (although someone had better realize it for
the sentence to be carried out) [Bird, 2002, 7-8].
Legal examples like this one benefit from both more formal procedures and obvious
normative changes. As Austin points out the law incorporates many special precautions
in order to avoid infelicities in general [Austin, 1975, 22]. In the case of passing sentence
the normative change is clear—it becomes appropriate to carry out the sentence passed,
whether that be by imprisoning the convicted person, or accepting payment of a fine,
etc. And clearly Bird is right that it is appropriate to do so even if the nominal
addressee of the judge, the person sentenced, is not paying attention and does not
recognize that sentence is being passed. However I am not convinced that sentence can
be passed if no one in the court recognizes what the judge is doing.5
Let me fill out the example somewhat for plausibility. Suppose that our judge
performed the appropriate locution, but due to the sudden simultaneous collapse of
the building was not heard by anyone. Since the judge was killed in the collapse
sentencing could not be resumed. What would happen? Almost certainly another
judge would be assigned to pass sentence, and it is hard to imagine anyone protesting
5It is a inconvenient difficulty of English that there is not a natural phrase that captures what the judge
is doing in this case. Saying that the judge is attempting to pass sentence suggests that he fails to produce
the requisite locution (i.e., he is interrupted, or has a bad cough, etc). On the other hand, saying that he
is passing sentence suggests exactly the kind of success that I am dubious occurs in Bird’s case. Perhaps
he might best be described as passing sentence unsuccessfully, despite the slight air of paradox attached to
that phrase. Consider as an analogy a false start to a race. It is not that the competitors are trying, and
failing, to get out of the blocks, but on the other hand, the race does not in fact start.
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that the prisoner was being sentenced twice for the same crime. Nor does anyone at all
hearing and recognizing the judge’s intent suffice. If much later a recording made in the
courtroom is discovered and the other sounds are removed to reveal the judge’s words
it does not become appropriate to carry out that “sentence”. So here it does seem
to be the case that someone in the court, albeit not necessarily the person sentenced,
must recognize the speech act as an act of sentencing.6
What about something less formal, like Austin’s example of ‘warning’ sotto voice?
If Mark is about to walk across the tracks in front of an oncoming train, and I say
“watch out for the train” under my breath, it seems unquestionable that I have not in
fact warned him. If he notices the train and avoids mishap I cannot take credit, and
if he is hit by the train I am blameable for failing to do all I could to prevent it. I
could have warned him but I did not. However, it is easy enough to imagine a case
where my warning is not recognized as such by the audience, but where I am still not
blameworthy for failing to warn them. If I do my best to be heard, yelling and waving
my arms to attract visual attention, but Mark is happily listening to Bach at a high
volume and steps onto the track unawares, I have, as we say, done all I could. This is
so even if no one else is present to hear my yells.7
6Another legal example from Bird concerns wills:
Dorothy writes a will. Her will is not found for some time after her death. When it is, it
eventually secures uptake. Writing, in the appropriate circumstance, “I leave £1,000,000 to the
cats’ home” constitutes a written illocutionary act of leaving her money to the cats’ home long
before the lawyers get to read the will [Bird, 2002, 8].
Here again the normative change is quite clear—in virtue of Dorothy’s will a million pounds from her
estate should be given to the cats’ home. And here I think we are inclined to say that even if the will never
achieves uptake, the cats’ home was entitled to that million pounds. If Dorothy’s daughter, ignorant of the
will, gives a million pounds of the estate to the home because she knows that is what her mother would have
wanted, she fulfils her obligation, albeit accidentally.
The difference between the two cases is in the nature of the accepted procedures for passing sentence versus
writing wills. The procedures surrounding passing sentence are designed in part to ensure and require simple
uptake on the part of the prisoner and the officers of the court. If none of them provide such uptake then
the procedures have not in fact been correctly followed. On the other hand, the procedures for preparing a
will are focused largely on ensuring that the will can be authenticated if read, and those procedures can be
correctly followed even in the absence of uptake.
7There is some question here as to whether we would say that I had warned Mark in this circumstance.
The verbs associated with illocutionary acts notoriously often do double duty for the perlocutionary acts
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The general picture is that when considering whether a given illocutionary act has
taken effect the central question is whether the appropriate change to what is “out of
order” or “in order” for that kind of illocutionary act has in fact occurred.8 If this
is right, then the question we should be asking with respect to women’s sex-related
speech acts is not whether they receive minimal uptake, but whether the appropriate
normative changes in fact occur.
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I am proposing that we understand MacKinnon’s silencing thesis in the following way:
pornography silences women by preventing their utterances from taking effect. As I will
argue in this section, the effect-based approach to illocutionary silencing is a better fit
for what MacKinnon descriptions of the silencing of women than the traditional uptake
based account. It also makes clear that objections to MacKinnon centred on the effects
of pornography on rapists largely miss the point.9
MacKinnon claims that women are silenced in the sexual sphere, especially with
respect to their ability to assert that they have been sexually harassed and abused and
their ability to refuse sex, or particular sexual activities.
Having power means ... that when someone says “This is how it is,” it is
taken as being that way. ... Powerlessness means that when you say “This
is how it is,” it is not taken as being that way [MacKinnon, 1987, 164].
we usually aim at via those illocutionary acts, so that ‘warning’ is used both for uttering a warning and for
successfully cautioning someone. What is clear is that I am not to blame for Mark being run over by the
train—that is, that the appropriate normative effect has taken place.
8Searle gives for each type of illocutionary act he discusses an essential condition, which takes the form
“counts as an ...”. For example, for promising he says it “counts as an undertaking of an obligation to ...”,
where the ... is the content of the promise [Searle, 1969, 63]. Searle’s framework is somewhat different than
Austin’s, but this strikes me as an attempt to get at a similar phenomena. The “counts as” formulation is a
reference to Searle’s notion of institutional facts. If a locution counts as a particular illocutionary act, then
this is a change in the institutional facts, and thus at least potentionally in the norms.
9This is not, I want to be clear, to give a positive argument in favour of MacKinnon’s views on pornogra-
phy, or for the claim that the sense in which women are silenced is in fact a sense relevant to the legal right
to free speech, either in the US or in other liberal democracies.
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When any one of them tries to tell what happened, she is told it did not
happen, she imagined it, she wanted it. Her no meant yes [MacKinnon, 1993,
5].
To put it in the terms of this paper, when people say “this is how it is” that
assertion takes effect in as far as it becomes in order to take it as being that way, and
out of order to not take it as being that way. Of course there is no guarantee that my
assertions will take effect in this way—that they will be accepted as fact. However in
general, often enough to make saying “this is how it is” worthwhile, people take things
to be the way I say they are. But when women attempt to make assertions regarding
the sexual sphere, these assertions generally do not take effect in this way.
It is now agreed that there is something wrong with sexual harassment.
But describe what happened to you, and it may be trivial or personal or
paranoid, or maybe you should have worn a bra that day [MacKinnon, 1987,
190].
The result is a situation in which the speech of women fails to have its usual
illocutionary force:
Your relation to speech is like shouting at a movie. Somebody stop that
man, you scream. The audience acts as though nothing has been said, or
turns slightly, embarrassed for you. The action on screen continues as if
nothing has been said [MacKinnon, 1993, 6].
MacKinnon’s descriptions of silencing do not take the form of a failure of the audi-
ence to recognize the illocutionary act as the act that it is. It is not that your actions
are unrecognized—rather, like shouting at a movie, they are futile. They are cases in
which the speech has no impact on the realm of social convention—in which the normal
changes in what is in order and out of order do not take place.
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What does it mean for a refusal to take effect in this sense? Refusals generally have
as their perlocutionary aim preventing certain events from taking place. If I refuse
dessert I intend to prevent dessert from being served to me, and perhaps in particular
cases I intend to prevent being charged for dessert, or to prevent dessert from being
made and wasted, and so on. But of course these perlocutionary effects may not
come about even in a perfectly successful case of refusing. One central—perhaps the
central—illocutionary effect of refusing is the realm of blame. If I refuse cake, then it
is not my fault if the cake is still brought, or if it is wasted, and I can not be properly
blamed for these events. Similarly, charging me for the cake is improper. Blame, and
charges, are out of order.
When it comes to rape however, blaming the victim is largely taken to be in order.
MacKinnon herself writes:
If you talk about rape, it will be agreed that rape is awful. But rape is a
conclusion. If a victim describes the facts of a rape, maybe she was asking
for it or enjoyed it or at least consented to it, or the man might have thought
she did, or maybe she had had sex before [MacKinnon, 1987, 190].
Victim-blaming in many cases looks very much like a situation where there is nom-
inal uptake for a refusal from later observers, and indeed even from the rapist, but
where the illocutionary act of refusal does not in fact take effect, in that it is not
considered out of order to blame the victim of the rape for the events that followed.
Another advantage of the effect-based analysis is that it makes clear that the issue is
not what the impact of pornography is or is not on the perpetrator of unwanted sexual
activity. The important question is not whether the immediate audience recognizes a
woman as refusing or not. Indeed, the question is not even whether we, as a broader
audience, recognize the woman as refusing or not, if that recognition is limited to simple
uptake. The question instead is whether, and to what degree, we hold her responsible
for what happens. In as far as we, as a society, find remarks such as ‘you shouldn’t have
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been there’, or ‘you shouldn’t have been drinking’, in order, in so far as MacKinnon
is right that women are told “you wanted it, you enjoyed it” [MacKinnon, 1993, 3]
then the woman’s attempt to refuse is not taking effect. If pornography could be
shown to contribute to that failure then MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences
women would be vindicated. Questions about whether the use of pornography makes
individuals more or less likely to rape are therefore simply irrelevant to the silencing
claim.10
The situation contemplated here is one in which women, as a class, are unsuc-
cessful in performing certain speech acts with respect to sexual activity. One might
object however that the account given also falls afoul of Dworkin’s notorious objec-
tion that MacKinnon confuses the right to free speech with a right to be understood
[Dworkin, 1991]. In saying that women’s assertions that “this is rape” don’t take ef-
fect because they are not accepted as fact, or that women’s refusals are not taken as
ameliorating responsibility, am I not positing a right to be understood and, even more
improbably, believed?
If the problem is understood solely as a problem of an individual woman—she
was raped but her behaviour was foolhardy, she said she was harassed but she is
just sensitive—then Dworkin’s response is telling. The right to free speech is not
plausibly construed as a right of an individual to be believed or understood. But the
interpretation of MacKinnon on offer places its emphasis not on the failure of individual
women to be understood, but on the systematic failure of women’s sexual speech to
function in the usual ways. As Ruth Millikan has pointed out, if no one ever complied
with directives or believed assertions the directive and assertive forms of language
would soon ceased to be used and understood [Millikan, 1998, 166, 174-75]. The same
thing is true for refusals. Mill conceives of the right to free speech as including a right
to be listened to. A systematic failure of women’s speech in the sexual sphere to take
10MacKinnon does in various places claim that pornography can play a causal role in the actions of rapists,
and so the issue is relevant to assessing MacKinnon’s arguments against pornography as a whole.
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effect suggests that we are failing to listen to women as a class, rather than failing
to believe individual women. Or to put the point differently, we are failing to believe
individual women because they are women.
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The picture we have arrived at is this. When illocutionary acts take effect certain
other actions become in order, or out of order, depending upon the act in question.
Failure to achieve uptake from the audience of your illocutionary act may indicate
that the act has not taken effect in this way, but it does not guarantee it. Nor does
receiving minimal uptake—recognition of the act you were performing—guarantee that
the act will effect changes in the social sphere. Illocutionary silencing occurs when your
illocutionary act does not take effect.
Not any kind of illocutionary silencing counts as a violation of a right to free speech.
But insofar as the illocutionary silencing of women is systematic, MacKinnon’s claim
that the free speech of women is at issue is comprehensible, and not, as Dworkin claims,
absurd. Furthermore, this analysis makes clear that the issue of whether a particular
rapist or sexual harrasser did or did not view pornography, and questions concerning
the causal effects of pornography on rapists and harrassers, are largely besides the
point with respect to the claim that pornography silences women.
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